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Abstract
We propose a novel hybrid universal network-coding cryptosystem (HUNCC) to obtain secure
post-quantum cryptography at high communication rates. The secure network-coding scheme we offer
is hybrid in the sense that it combines information-theory security with public-key cryptography. In
addition, the scheme is general and can be applied to any communication network, and to any public-key
cryptosystem. Our hybrid scheme is based on the information theoretic notion of individual secrecy,
which traditionally relies on the assumption that an eavesdropper can only observe a subset of the
communication links between the trusted parties – an assumption that is often challenging to enforce.
For this setting, several code constructions have been developed, where the messages are linearly mixed
before transmission over each of the paths in a way that guarantees that an adversary which observes
only a subset has sufficient uncertainty about each individual message.
Instead, in this paper, we take a computational viewpoint, and construct a coding scheme in which
an arbitrary secure cryptosystem is utilized on a subset of the links, while a pre-processing similar
to the one in individual security is utilized. Under this scheme, we demonstrate 1) a computational
security guarantee for an adversary which observes the entirety of the links 2) an information theoretic
security guarantee for an adversary which observes a subset of the links, and 3) information rates which
approach the capacity of the network and greatly improve upon the current solutions.
A perhaps surprising consequence of our scheme is that, to guarantee a computational security
level b, it is sufficient to encrypt a single link using a computational post-quantum scheme. That is,
using HUNCC, we can ensure post-quantum security in networks where it is not possible to use public-
key encryption over all the links in the network. In addition, the information rate approaches 1 as the
number of communication links increases. As a concrete example, in a multipath network with three
links, using a 128-bit computationally secure McEliece cryptosystem only over one link, we obtain a
128-bit computational security level over all paths with a total information rate of 0.91 in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The connection between Information Theory and Cryptography goes back to Shannon himself
– it is said that his work in security inspired his seminal work on communications. There, he
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2Fig. 1: Post-quantum secure multipath network with l paths, one source, Alice, one legitimate
destination, Bob, and two types of possible eavesdropper’s, Eve, weak and strong, which can
obtain the information transmitted over w < l or all the l paths, respectively.
defines the information-theoretic notion of perfect secrecy when studying the setting where two
users, Alice and Bob wish to communicate privately in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve.
Under perfect secrecy, H(M |X) = H(M), where H is the entropy, M is the private message,
and X is the encrypted message sent through the communication network. If Eve can observe
the encrypted message X completely, perfect privacy can only be obtained if both Alice and
Bob share a random key, R, with entropy as large as the message, i.e. H(R) ≥ H(M) [1].
This necessity in Alice and Bob sharing large secret keys is often non-practical, e.g. if Alice
and Bob are geographically distant. Hence, much effort has been devoted to developing alternative
solutions which relax upon the perfect secrecy condition. One such relaxation comes from
assuming that the eavesdropper has limited computational power. Such schemes, referred to
as computationally secure in this paper, rely on the conjecture that certain one-way functions
are hard to invert [2]. Thus, Alice encrypts the private message using a one-way function before
sending it to Bob. This function should be hard for Eve to invert, but inversion for Bob should
be possible if he possesses the right key. One way to achieve this is via public-key cryptography.
A public-key cryptosystem consists of an encryption function Enc(·), a decryption function
Dec(·), a secret key s, and a public key p. The encryption function uses the public key to
encrypt the private message M into Enc(M, p). The decryption function uses the secret key to
decrypt the encrypted message M = Dec[Enc(M, p), s]. The critical property is that decrypting
the encrypted message without the secret key is computationally expensive. Although there are
many ways of characterizing this, we will focus on the notion of security level. Informally, a
public-key cryptosystem has security level b, referred to as being b-bit secure, if the amount
of operations expected to decode the encrypted message, without knowledge of the secret key,
3is 2b.
One of the first, and most widely used, public-key cryptosystems is the RivestShamirAdleman
(RSA) cryptosystem [3]. The security of RSA relies on the hardness conjecture of two math-
ematical problems: integer factorization and the RSA problem. In 1994 however, Peter Shor
presented a polynomial-time algorithm for integer factorization, known as Shor’s algorithm [4]
– with the caveat that the algorithm runs on a quantum computer. In other words, if sufficiently
large quantum computers are ever to be built, Shor’s algorithm can be used to break the RSA
cryptosystem [5]–[9]. This subsequently led to an increased interest in cryptosystems which are
resilient to quantum attacks, a field known as post-quantum cryptography [10], [11].
A candidate for post-quantum cryptography, known as the McEliece cryptosystem, was in-
troduced in [12]. The McEliece cryptosystem is immune to attacks that use Shor’s algorithm.
Interestingly, the McEliece is also based on a connection between cryptography and commu-
nication theory – its security relies on the fact that decoding a general linear code is NP-hard
[13]. The original scheme uses binary Goppa codes [14], [15]. Apart from having no known
quantum attacks, the encryption and decryption algorithms are faster than those of RSA. Two
main disadvantages of McEliece are: i) in usual applications, the size of the public key is
much larger than that of RSA and ii) it suffers from a large communication overhead, with a
communication rate around 0.5 in the original paper.
One may be tempted to increase the communication rate by changing the parameters of
the Goppa code. However, a key result pertaining to the communication rate was presented in
[16], where a polynomial time algorithm was given for distinguishing the matrix of a high rate
Goppa code with a random matrix. Therefore, the security of high rates Goppa code may not
be guaranteed. Another idea is to look at other families of codes, away from Goppa codes. As
shown in Table II, most of them have been broken.
In parallel with the advances in computational security, another relaxation on perfect privacy
was considered in the literature, mostly by information theorists [17]–[23]. Instead of restricting
the computational power of the eavesdropper, in physical layer security one limits how much
information Eve can obtain about the encrypted message. In this setting, information-theoretic
security can be obtained at the expense of the communication rate, as shown in the seminal work
of Wyner [17], where he introduced the wiretap channel – the analog of the classical Alice, Bob
and Eve triple under the physical layer security assumption. For example, in [24] it is assumed
that the eavesdropper can observe any set w out of a total of n transmitted symbols. Denoting this
set by YEw , it was shown that there exist encryption codes with communication rate
n−w
n
which
does not leak any information about the message to the eavesdropper, i.e. H(M |YEw) = H(M).
The price to pay in rate to achieve perfect secrecy in physical layer security is significant –
decreasing the rate of the legitimate communication is necessary.
In an effort to increase the efficiency in terms of rate, yet another relaxation of the perfect
secrecy of Shannon was introduced, namely individual secrecy [25]–[36]. This is best explained
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Fig. 2: Secure post-quantum solutions for a multipath network with two paths, one source Alice
with two messages M1 and M2, one legitimate destination Bob, and two types of possible
eavesdropper’s Eve, weak and strong, which can obtain the information transmitted over one or
two paths, respectively. (a) One-time pad [1] (b) McEliece cryptosystem [12], using [2960, 2288]-
Goppa code suggested recently for long term security in [10] (c) Network coding wiretap II
[20] (d) Individual Security for networks [36] (e) Proposed hybrid universal network-coding
cryptosystem (HUNCC), with rate that converges to 1 as O (1/l).
in a network setup, where Alice has many messages to send to Bob, say M1, . . . ,Mm, and Eve
may observe any w of them. By increasing the rate beyond the limits given by the wiretap
channel of Wyner, it is inevitable that information will be leaked. Yet, it is unclear whether the
eavesdropper Eve is able to utilize this information to recover the sent messages.
The notion of individual secrecy crystallizes this concept by guaranteeing that H(Mi|YE,w) =
H(Mi), for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Note that this is generally weaker than perfect secrecy, where
H(M1, . . . ,Mm|YE,w) = H(M1, . . . ,Mm). In other words, the information that Eve obtains from
her observation does not help her decipher each individual message – rather it is information
about the combination of the messages. Individual secrecy is definitely a weaker notion of
security, yet it often allows to increase the rate drastically, sometimes even making the encryption
process free in terms of rate. While there is no doubt that efficient rates are beneficial, the
assumptions of physical layer security, namely that Eve does not experience a worse channel
than Bob, are hard to enforce in practice. Figure 2 depicts a simple example of secure post-
quantum candidates for multipath networks based on the following security solutions considered
in the literature we elaborated above, (a) One-time pad [1] (b) McEliece cryptosystem [12] (c)
Network coding wiretap II [20] (d) Individual Security for networks [36].
5Main Contribution
In this work, we consider a new hybrid network-coding cryptosystem (HUNCC) to obtain
post-quantum cryptography at high rates. In this secure network-coding scheme, we combine
the computational security principles, with the physical layer security primitives, thus introducing
a hybrid system which relies on both individual secrecy, and computational secure cryptosystems.
We illustrate this concept via a multi-path secure transmission scheme, where multiple mes-
sages are to be sent between Alice and Bob, using parallel links. By doing so, we are able
to address one of the main shortcomings of physical layer security, namely that the adversary
eavesdropper cannot observe all the messages sent between Alice and Bob. In the system we
will introduce shortly, Eve may in fact observe the entirety of the transmission between Alice
and Bob.
We will make an assumption on Eve’s computational power however, similar to computa-
tionally secure systems. On the other hand, instead of encrypting the entirety of the messages
from Alice using public-key cryptography, we only encrypt over some of the communication
links. Under the computational limitation assumption, the links that are encrypted are analogous
to losses for Eve – and thus, we may now employ traditional techniques from physical layer
security codes. In other words, we are able to enforce that the eavesdropper only observe part
of the messages, via cryptography, under the computational limitation assumption. This, in turn,
allows an increase in the communication rate – similar to what is done in individual secrecy,
while still providing security guarantees that are computationally strong. If Alice and Bob have
more communication channels, the communication rate will be even larger. Indeed, the rate goes
to one as the number of channels increases. In Table I, we compare the performance of the
individual secure coding scheme and the original McEliece cryptosystem to our proposed hybrid
scheme.
Ind. Sec. Code [36] HUNCC McEliece Cryp. [37]
Encrypted paths 0 c l
Information rate RIS = 1 (cRC + (l − c)RIS)/l RC < 1
Public-key size 0 pC pC
Ind. comp. secrecy 0 min{c, 1} · b b
Ind. secrecy (l − w)/l (l − w)/l 0
TABLE I: For a multipath network with l paths we compare individually secure codes, our hybrid
code HUNCC, and the McEliece cryptosystem, where in the original McEliece Cryptosystem,
the rate RC ≈ 0.5. The parameter c corresponds to the number of encrypted path in HUNCC,
w is the number of links that a weak eavesdropper observes, and b is the security level of the
McEliece Cryptosystem using public-key pC .
In recently considered heterogeneous networks, one may not assume that the cryptosystem,
with the public-key, can be applied on all paths. The HUNCC coding scheme can ensure
6post-quantum security across the entire network, using the public-key only for the information
transmitted over one path. Moreover, we show important applications in which HUNCC is
applicable. Specifically, we consider single path communication, distributed storage, ultra-reliable
low-latency streaming communications, and the case of myopic adversaries.
For a network with two paths, we illustrate our hybrid scheme in Figure 2e: Alice wants
to send a private message M = [M1,M2] ∈ F2qu to Bob via l = 2 communication links. An
eavesdropper, Eve, depending on how strong she is, can observe the communication in one or
both of these channels.
Alice and Bob agree on a public key encryption scheme (Enc,Dec, p, s). Alice first encodes
the message M using the individually secure code with generator matrix G = ( 1 12 1 ). We denote
this encoding by X = MG = [M1 + M2,M1 + 2M2]. Alice then encodes Enc(X1, p), sends it
to Bob via channel 1, and sends X2 via channel 2. Bob then decodes X1 = Dec(Enc(X1, p), s)
to retrieve all of X and multiplies by the inverse of the generator matrix to retrieve the original
message M = XG−1.
If Eve is a weak eavesdropper, observing only one communication channel, the scheme is
information-theoretically individually secure irrespective of her computational power. This occurs
because each piece of the message, Mi, is independent from any single Xj . If Eve is a strong
eavesdropper, observing both communication channels, each message Mi will be computationally
secure with almost the same security level as the encryption scheme (Enc,Dec, p, s). Indeed,
we show in Theorem 1 that if the best known attack on (Enc,Dec, p, s) needs 2b operations to
break it, then Eve needs at least 2b − 
2b
operations to determine any message Mi, where  is
the amount of operations needed to solve a 2× 2 linear system.1
We note that for the individually secure code G to work, Fqu must have characteristic larger
than 2. Also, the image of the individually secure code must be injectively mapped into the
domain of the encryption function Enc. We consider the following example.
Suppose Alice and Bob agree on using a 128-bit McEliece cryptosystem. Utilizing the sugges-
tion in [10], Bob selects a [2960, 2288]-Goppa code with a public key of 1537536 bits2. In this
case, the domain of the encryption function is F22882 . Alice and Bob must agree on an injective
mapping from the image of the code G, given by Fqu with characteristic larger than 2, to F22882 .
In this case, they could set qu = 31443 so that log2(qu) ≈ 2287.1 bits. Thus, Alice can map
X1 into a 2288 bit vector and encode it using the Goppa code into E(X1, p) ∈ F29602 . Alice
will then send log2 |E(X1, p)| = 2960 bits through link 1 and log2 |X2| ≈ 2287.1 bits through
link 2. Thus, the total communication cost will be around 5248 bits giving a communication
rate slightly larger than 0.87. By Theorem 1 both messages, M1 and M2 are 128-bit secure. In
Section VII-E, we look at an example where Alice and Bob agree on using an RSA scheme.
1Using Gaussian elimination would make  ≈ 10 operations.
2Original parameters of McEliece cryptosystem [12], namely [1024, 524]-Goppa code with a rate of approximate 0.5 obtain
around 58-bit security level considering recent attacks [10].
7The structure of this work is as follows. In Section II, we provide a background on the main
security blocks we use in the proposed solution. In Section III, we formally describe the system
model. The security notions and the threat models we will use in the paper are defined in
Section IV. In Section V, we present our scheme HUNCC with our main results. In Section VI
we analyze the performance of HUNCC and discuss our results. In Section VII, we present a
few examples for which HUNCC is applicable. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we give some background information on the two main building blocks of our
scheme: i) computational secure cryptosystems and, ii) information-theoretic individual security.
We note that, although we focus on the McEliece Cryptosystem, any computationally secure
cryptosystem can be used in our scheme. In Section VII-E, we provide an example of how the
original RSA can be used in our scheme.
A. Computationally Secure Cryptosystems
We start by introducing some helpful notation and definitions for public-key cryptosystems.
Definition 1. A public-key encryption is a tuple (Enc,Dec, p, s, kb, nb) where:
• Enc : {0, 1}kb × P → {0, 1}nb is the encryption function, Dec : {0, 1}nb × S → {0, 1}kb
is the deciphering function, and p ∈ P and s ∈ S represent the public and private key
respectively,
• For a message m¯ ∈ {0, 1}kb , a public key p ∈ P , and the corresponding secret key s ∈ S,
Dec(Enc(m¯, p), s) = m¯,
A public-key encryption (Enc,Dec, p, s, kb, nb) has security level b if the best known algorithm
to recover m¯ with the knowledge of Enc(m¯) and p alone needs to perform at least 2b operations.
Finally (Enc,Dec, p, s, kb, nb) is said to have rate R if R = kb/nb.
Parameters for long-term security in post-quantum cryptography were suggested in [10], [38].
These parameters determine a trade-off between the security level, the information rate, and the
size of the public-key in the cryptosystems. We focus now on the McEliece cryptosystem and
take a look at RSA in Section VII-E.
1) The McEliece Cryptosystem: The original McEliece cryptosystem [12] remains unbroken.
In this scheme, Bob produces a generator matrix G ∈ Fkb×nbq by randomly choosing an irreducible
polynomial of degree t over GF (2d), which corresponds to an irreducible Goppa code of length
nb = 2
d and dimension kb ≥ nb − td. Note that this code can correct at least t errors3 and can
be decoded efficiently [11]. Bob then generates two matrices with the intent of concealing G,
3We note that in [10, Section 7], they consider nb −
√
nb(nb − 2t− 2) ≥ t+ 1 errors instead of t errors.
8a random dense nonsingular matrix S ∈ Fkb×kbq and a random permutation matrix P ∈ Fnb×nbq .
The scheme works as follows.
Key Generation:
• Public Key: Bob generates the public key (Gpub = SGP, t) , where Gpub ∈ Fkb×nbq . Both
Alice and Eve have access to it.
• Private Key: The private key consists of (S, DG,P), where DG is an efficient decoding
algorithm for G.
Encryption: To encrypt a message m¯ ∈ F kbq , Alice randomly chooses a vector z ∈ F nb of weight
t and encrypts it as c = m¯Gpub ⊕ z.
Decryption: To decrypt the message, Bob first calculates cP−1 = m¯SG⊕zP−1, and then applies
the decoding algorithm DG. Since cP−1 has hamming distance t, it follows that, m¯SG =
DG(cP−1). Then, since both G and S are invertible, m¯ = (m¯SG)G−1S−1.
Many attempts have been made to improve the performance of the original McEliece cryp-
tosystem by replacing Goppa codes with other families of codes. Most of these, however, have
been broken. We summarize some of these attempts in Table II.
Family Code Proposed by Broken by
Goppa McEliece, 1978 [12] -
Reed Solomon Niederreiter, 1986 [39] Sidelnikov et al, 1992 [40]
Concatenated Niederreiter, 1986 [39] Sendrieret al, 1998 [41]
Read-Muller Sidelnikov, 1994 [42] Minder et al, 2007 [43]
LDPC Monico et al, 2000 [44] Monico et al, 2000 [44]
Convolutional codes Lo¨ndahl et al, 2012 [45] Landias et al, 2013 [46]
TABLE II: Code-based encryption systems.
B. Individual Information-theoretic Security
Individual security operates under the assumption that Eve is a weak eavesdropper YEw , i.e.
only has access to w communication paths. The privacy guarantee is that, while Bob is able to
decode completely all the ku ∈ Fqu messages transmitted over the network of length kb ∈ F2
bits each, Eve is ignorant with respect to each individual message. Thus,
H(Mj|YEw) = H(Mj) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ku}.
In general, individual security does not imply perfect privacy over the entire messages transmit-
ted. Eve may potentially obtain information about mixtures of the encrypted messages transmit-
ted. In many applications, this information is considered insignificant [26]–[36]. If the messages
are statistically independent, this means that,
I(Mku ;YEw |M1, . . . ,Mku−1) = H(Mku)−H(Mku|YEw ,M1, . . . ,Mku−1) ≥ I(Mku ;YEw).
9In [36], individually security is generalized to ks-individual perfect secrecy, where ks ≤ ku−w,
such that the eavesdropper has zero mutual information with any set of ku − w messages i.e.,
I(Mku−w, YEw) = 0. (1)
And in [47], the assumption that the messages be independently and uniformly distributed, is
removed.
The authors in [36] present two code constructions which satisfy (1), a random code over a
binary field, and a (ku, w)-linear code over a field Fqu with u ≥ ku, where
ku ≥
⌈
l
l − w
⌉
≥ 2,
and the number of paths, l, is greater or equal to ku. We now show a detailed code construction
of the linear code.
Code Generation: Let C be a linear code over Fqu , with u ≥ ku, of length ku and dimension w,
and set ks = ku−w. Let G??IS ∈ Fw×kuqu be a generator matrix for C and G?IS ∈ Fks×kuqu a generator
for the null space of C. Finally, let HIS ∈ Fks×kuqu and G˜IS ∈ Fw×kuqu , be the parity check matrix
and the basis matrix for the code C, respectively, i.e. such that, HISG?TIS = I and G˜ISG??IS = I
yet G˜ISG?IS = 0. Then, the individual security code is generated by
[
G?IS
G??IS
]
∈ Fku×kuqu .
It is important to note that unlike in public-key cryptosystems, and in particular the McEliece
cryptosystem, in physical-layer security schemes, the generation matrix and the code is public.
Thus, we can assume that both Bob and Eve have access to all the matrices described above.
Encryption: Alice encrypts the message M ∈ Fku×1qu as XT = MT
[
G?IS
G??IS
]
∈ F1×kuqu .
Decryption: To decrypt the message, Bob uses the parity check matrix HIS and the basis matrix
G˜IS to compute (M1; . . . ;Mk′) = HISX and (Mk′+1; . . . ;Mk) = G˜ISX . By [36], since Eve only
observes w symbols from the encrypted vector XT she is not able to decode and is completely
ignorant with respect to any set k − w symbols of information transmitted over the network.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network consisting of a source node, Alice, connected to a destination node,
Bob, via l noiseless independent communication links. The network is illustrated in Figure 1.
The goal is for Alice to transmit ku messages M = [M1; . . . ;Mku ] ∈ F kuqu , of length kb ∈ F2 bits
each, privately to Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. In this paper, our main focus is
on post-quantum security. Thus, we assume Eve has access to a quantum computer.
We denote by Y = [Y1; . . . ;Yl] the vector of messages which Alice sends to Bob via each
communication link. These messages must be such that Bob is able to decode M from them.
Thus, we say Y is reliable if H(M |Y ) = 0. The messages Y , however, should satisfy certain
properties if Eve is not to decode M herself. This will depend on how powerful Eve is.
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We consider two types of Eve. A strong Eve, Es, which observes all communication links,
having access to the entirety of Y . And a weak Eve, Ew, which only observes a subset of the
communication links. We denote the observations of each by YEs and YEw , respectively. We note
that because of reliability, information-theoretic privacy is not obtainable against a strong Eve.
IV. SECURITY DEFINITIONS
In this section, we define the security notions and the threat models used in the rest of the
paper. Throughout, we assume a ciphertext-only attack model, i.e., the adversary Eve only has
access to YEs or YEw . Standard techniques from cryptography allow to expand the threat model
to chosen-plaintext attacks, see e.g. [48]. We first define the notion of computational security.
Definition 2. A cryptosystem with message M and ciphertext c(M) has security level b if the
best known algorithm needs to perform at least 2b operations to decode M from the observation
of c(M) alone in expectation4.
It should be noted that this definition of security level imposes implicitly a restriction on
the size of the encoded message M , and on its distribution. Indeed, assuming a public-key
cryptosystem, the adversary may always use a brute-force attack, by guessing potential message
inputs until the correct one is found. Generally, it is assumed that the message M takes a value
uniformly at random in a set {0, 1}kb , and thus it follows that kb ≥ b. In fact, most cryptosystems
require kb to be strictly larger than b. Throughout this paper, we opt to leave this relationship
implicit, and rather focus on the security level b, and select the appropriate kb based on this
security level.
The computation security level of Definition 2 is relevant in the case of a single link, or
equivalently a single message. When there are several messages being transmitted on each link,
it is desirable to provide a security guarantee that applies to each message individually. For a
weak Eve, this can be obtained via information-theoretic individual secrecy.
Definition 3. A cryptosystem with messages M1, . . . ,Ml is (l, w)-individually secure if for every
ω ⊂ [l], with |ω| = w, H(Ms|Yω) = H(Ms) where Yω = [Mi]i∈ω.
Remark 1. It should be noted that the linear code construction given in Section II-B actually
guarantees a stronger notion of individual secrecy, c.f. (1). While such distinction is important –
it reduces the possible set of joint messages M1, . . . ,Ml exponentially – the notion of individual
secrecy in Definition 3 is more convenient to manipulate, and turns out to be sufficient to prove
our main results.
4The expectation is taken over the distribution of X , and in the case that the best decoding algorithm is a randomized
algorithm, also taken over the randomized algorithm. Also note that while this notion of security is in expectation, it can be
generalized to a stronger notion, e.g. that the algorithm takes less at least 2b operations with probability at least 1− , for some
small , see [49].
11
Fig. 3: Hybrid post-quantum secure multipath network scheme.
For a strong Eve, which can observe the entirety of the sent messages, (l, w)-individual security
is unobtainable. Instead, we propose a notion of individual computational security, which states
that the decoding of any message on any of the paths would require 2b operations.
Definition 4 (Individual Computational Secrecy). A cryptosystem with messages M1, . . . ,Ml
and ciphertexts ci , ci(M1, . . . ,Ml), for i = 1, . . . , l has security level b if the best known
algorithm needs to perform at least 2b operations to decode any Mj , j = 1, . . . , l from the
observations c1, . . . , cl, in expectation.
Note that individual computational secrecy implies in the computational security of the cryp-
tosystem with M = [M1, . . . ,Ml] and c(M) = [c1(M1, . . . ,Ml), . . . , cl(M1, . . . ,Ml)]. It is
therefore a strictly stronger notion of security.
V. HYBRID UNIVERSAL NETWORK-CODING CRYPTOSYSTEM (HUNCC)
In this section, we present our proposed hybrid cryptosystem, which we refer to as Hybrid
Universal Network-Coding Cryptosystem (HUNCC). In Figure 3, we illustrate how HUNCC
operates on a multipath network with l communication links.
At a high level, the cryptosystem works as follows. Alice and Bob agree on a public-key
cryptosystem (Enc,Dec, p, s, kb, nb) as in Definition 1. Alice then selects c of the l links to
be encrypted links. This alone does not provide full security, as the l − c links which do
not experience encryption are unsecured. To solve this, we introduce an extra step before the
encryption phase in which the messages are mixed using an individually secure linear code as in
Section II-B. By doing this, we show in Theorem 1, that each message is now computationally
secure. The security performance and the total communication rate of the scheme will depend
on the choice of c and of the parameters of the public-key cryptosystem.
12
Fig. 4: HUNNC encoding scheme at Alice.
A. Scheme Description
We now give a more detailed explanation of HUNCC, as presented in Algorithm 1. We start
by looking at the encoding process at Alice, illustrated in Figure 4. Let (Enc,Dec, p, s, kb, nb)
be a public-key cryptosystem, as described in Definition 1, with security level b. As usual, the
public key is generated by Bob and provided to Alice over some public communication channel.
Alice chooses a number c of paths to be encrypted. Without loss of generality, we let the paths
indexed by 1, . . . , c to be the encrypted ones. Let u ≥ l, be fixed, and consider blocks of
messages M (1), . . . ,M (dkb/ue), where each M (i) = [M (i)1 , . . . ,M
(i)
l ] with M
(i)
j ∈ F2u is generated
independently, and uniformly at random. Let G??IS ∈ Fw×l2u be an (l, w)-individually secure linear
code5 as in Section II-B, where w ≤ l − c. Select a generator matrix G?IS ∈ Fc×l2u for the null
space of the code. Note that since u ≥ l and l − w ≥ 1, such a code exists. The individual
secrecy encoding matrix is then given by GIS =
[
G?IS
G??IS
]
. Thus, the vectors X(1), . . . , X(dkb/ue),
where X(i) = M (i)GIS correspond to an (l, w)-individual secrecy encoding of M (i) (c.f. lines
1-5 in Algorithm 1).
Now, for every path i ∈ [c], consider the collection of symbols X(1)i , . . . , X(dkb/ue)i . Since
F2u ' Fu2 , the collection X(1)i , . . . , X(dkb/ue)i can be injectively mapped into a sequence of bits
b¨i of length kb. Each b¨i is encoded via the public-key encryption before being sent, i.e., each
link i transmits yi = Enc(b¨i, pi). Note that yi is of length n (c.f. lines 6-13 in Algorithm 1).
For the paths i > c, Alice directly sends the collection X(1)i , . . . , X
(dkb/ue)
i unencrypted. For
consistency, it will be easier to also assume that the data sent on the path is a bit sequence b¨i,
this time of length kb (c.f. lines 14-16 in Algorithm 1).
We now detail the decoding process at Bob. As per Section III, we assume that all paths are
error-free. Hence, Bob obtains all the messages transmitted over the network. For the c encrypted
5For practical consideration, if the number of the paths l is high, such that one receives more than kb bits representing l in
the binary field, it is possible to divide the set of messages, ku, Alice encodes together and perform the same process for each
set. This division can be used as well to reduce the field size of the individual security code.
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Algorithm 1 Hybrid Universal Network-Coding Cryptosystem (HUNCC)
Input: At Alice, ku messages M = [M1; . . . ;Mku ] ∈ F kuqu of length kb ∈ F2 bits each
Encoding scheme at Alice:
1: Stage 1: Individual secrecy encoding
2: For u ≥ l, represent the ku messages in a block [M (1), . . . ,M (dkb/ue)] ∈ F2u
3: for each column i ∈ {1, . . . , dkb/ue} in the block [M (1), . . . ,M (dkb/ue)] do
4: X(i) = M (i)GIS
5: end for
6: Stage 2: Public-key encryption
7: for each path 1 ≤ i ≤ c which support cryptosystem do
8: b¨i ∈ Fkb2 ← [X(1)i , . . . , X(dkb/ue)i ] ∈ F2u
9: yi = Enc(b¨i, pi)
10: end for
Transmission over the multipath network:
11: for each path 1 ≤ i ≤ c which support cryptosystem do
12: Transmit yi
13: end for
14: for each remaining path 1 ≤ i ≤ (l − c) without cryptosystem do
15: Transmit yi = [X
(1)
i , . . . , X
(dkb/ue)
i ] ∈ F2u (if required yi ∈ Fkb2 ← yi ∈ F2u)
16: end for
Decoding scheme at Bob:
17: Stage 1: Public-key decryption
18: for each path 1 ≤ i ≤ c with cryptosystem do
19: [X
(1)
i , . . . , X
(dkb/ue)
i ]← Dec(yi, si)
20: end for
21: Stage 2: Individual secrecy decoding
22: for each column i ∈ {1, . . . , dkb/ue} in the block [X(1), . . . , X(dkb/ue)] do
23: (M i1; . . . ;M
i
l−c) = HISX i
24: (M il−c+1; . . . ;M
i
l ) = G˜ISX i.
25: end for
Output: At Bob, M = [M1; . . . ;Mku ] ∈ F kuqu
paths, Bob uses the private-key to decode the messages (c.f. lines 17-20 in Algorithm 1). Thus,
Bob obtains [X(1)i , . . . , X
(dkb/ue)
i ] = Dec(yi, si) for every i ∈ [c]. The messages obtained via the
remaining l−c paths were unencrypted. Thus, together with the decrypted messages from the first
c paths, Bob has the entirety of X(1), . . . , X(dkb/ue). Now, for each i-th column in the estimated
encoded block, Bob uses the parity check HIS ∈ Fc×l2u and the basis matrix G˜IS ∈ Fw×l2u , as defined
in Section II-B, to obtain the original messages transmitted (c.f. lines 21-25 in Algorithm 1),
i.e. (M i1; . . . ;M
i
l−c) = HISX i and (M il−c+1; . . . ;M il ) = G˜ISX i.
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B. Security and Information Rate
We prove that HUNCC is computationally secure, as per Definition 4. This makes HUNCC
well suited for dealing with a strong Eve which observes the entirety of the communication
links. The proof relies on the following elementary lemma, which is the key interface between
the computational security of the public-key cryptosystem, and the individual secrecy of the
linear code.
Lemma 1. Let f : X → V be an injective function with computational security level b, i.e.,
the inversion function f−1(f(X)) = X takes at least 2b operations in expectation to complete.
Consider an arbitrary pair of random variables (X, Y ), such that X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y are
independent. Then, any function g : V × Y → X such that g(f(X), Y ) = X takes at least 2b
operations to complete in expectation.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Denote by Comp(h(x)) the number of operations that the
best algorithm for computing a function h(x) assumes. Assume that there exists a function g
such that g(f(X), Y ) = X with EX,Y [Comp(g(f(X), Y ))] < 2b. We have:
EX,Y [Comp(g(f(X), Y ))] = E [E[Comp(g(f(X), Y ))|Y ]]
=
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)E[Comp(g(f(X), y))] < 2b.
Thus, there must exist a specific y0 ∈ Y such that E[Comp(g(f(X), y0))] < 2b. But then, the
function h : V → X defined as h(v) = g(v, y0) completes in less than 2b operations, which is a
contradiction.
Lemma 1 essentially states that an independent and unrelated observation Y may not help in
decoding more efficiently a ciphertext f(X).
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 1. Let u ≥ l, c ≥ 1, and (Enc,Dec, p, s, kb, nb) be a public-key cryptosystem with
security level b. Then, the cryptosystem with input M = [M1; . . . ;Ml] ∈ F kuqu in Algorithm 1
is individually computationally secure with level at least b − δ/2b, where δ is the number of
operations needed to solve an l × l linear system of equations, i.e. δ = O(l3).
Proof. The proof is in two parts. First, we show that recovering B¨i, for i = 1, . . . , c requires at
least 2b operations. Next, we show that there cannot be a decoding algorithm g(Y1, . . . , Yl) = Mj
which completes with too few operations, as otherwise, such decoding could be used to decipher
B¨i more efficiently. For ease of notation, we let c = 1, i.e., only one path is being encoded, and
l = 2, i.e. there are only two paths in total. The general case follows mutadis mutandis.
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Part 1: Recovering B¨i is hard: We start by showing that it takes at least 2b operations to
recover B¨1. Let g(Y1,Y2) = B¨1 be any decoding function that Eve employs. We have:
H(B¨1|Y2) = H(X(1)1 , . . . , X(kb/u)1 |X(1)2 , . . . , X(kb/u)2 )
=
k/u∑
j=1
H(X
(j)
1 |X(j)2 )
=
k/u∑
j=1
H(X
(j)
1 )
= H(B¨1),
where the penultimate equality follows from the individual secrecy assumption on GIS. Therefore,
we have that B¨1 is independent of Y2. Since Y1 = Enc(B¨1), we thus have that the decoding
function of Eve g(Enc(B¨1),Y2) falls under the setting of Lemma 1, and thus requires at least
2b operations to complete since (Enc,Dec, p, s, kb, nb) has security level b.
Part 2: Recovering Mj cannot be too easy: Let g(Y1, Y2) = Mj = [M1j , . . . ,M
[kb/u]
j ] com-
plete in 2b˜ operations for j = 1, 2. Since Y2 = B¨2 can be written equivalently as [X12 , . . . , X
[kb/u]
l ],
we can construct the matrix:
A =
[
M1j . . . M
i
j . . . M
[kb/u]
j
X12 . . . X
i
2 . . . X
[kb/u]
2
]
Next, using Lemma 2, there exist a matrix A˜, which can be constructed from GIS such that:
A˜A =
[
X11 . . . X
i
j . . . X
[kb/u]
1
X12 . . . X
i
2 . . . X
[kb/u]
2
]
=
[
X1
X2
]
Note that, in general, performing this matrix multiplication takes no more than δ = O(l3)
operations6 as we will show in Lemma 2. Therefore, using once again the fact that B¨1 can be
obtained equivalently from [X11 , . . . , X
[kb/u]
1 ], we just constructed an Algorithm to recover B¨1
from the observations Y1,Y2 using 2b˜+δ operations. It follows from Part 1 that log(2b˜+δ) ≥ b,
which implies in b˜ ≥ log(2b− δ). Finally, via Taylor expansion, when δ is sufficiently small, we
get:
log(2b − δ) = b+ log(1− δ/2b) ≈ b− δ/2b.
Therefore, we get that recovering Mj must take at least b− δ/2b operations.
We now prove Lemma 2, used in the proof of the Theorem above.
6Precise constants can be obtained, and depend on the field F2u over which the matrix inversion is performed. In any case,
these constants are negligible when looking at the overall computational security for b in the order of 50 or more.
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Lemma 2. Let GIS be an individually secure encoding matrix as defined in Section II-B, such
that X i = M iGIS. Let M ic and X
i
c denotes any set of c symbols from the columns M
i and X i,
and M il−c and X
i
l−c the remaining symbols, respectively. For each i-th column, given M
i
c and
X il−c one can obtain X
i
c in O(l3) operations.
Proof. The individually secure linear code defines 2u(ku−c) cosets. One of them is the code itself.
Each coset contains 2uc codewords. The vector M ic is used as the index to choose the coset, and
M il−c is used to select the codeword within the coset. Since, given M
i
c , we known the specific
coset selected, from X il−c we can know the codeword selected in the coset. Note that X
i
l−c
contain exactly uc bits, which is the same number of bits that represent the possible codewords
in each coset. Such that using the index of the codeword we obtain M il−c. Now that we have
the entire column M i, we can use the encoding matrix GIS to obtain X ic. We can represent this
as solving the linear system,
M i1G
?
IS(1, 1) + · · ·+ M icG?IS(c, 1) +M ic+1G??IS(1, 1) + · · ·+ M ilG??IS(l − c, 1)
... · · ·
... · · ·
...
M i1G
?
IS(1, c) + · · ·+ M icG?IS(c, c) +M ic+1G??IS(1, c) + · · ·+ M ilG??IS(l − c, c)
M i1G
?
IS(1, c+ 1) + · · ·+ M icG?IS(c, c+ 1) +M ic+1G??IS(1, c+ 1) + · · ·+ M ilG??IS(l − c, c+ 1)
... · · ·
... · · ·
...
M i1G
?
IS(1, l) + · · ·+ M icG?IS(c, l) +M ic+1G??IS(1, l) + · · ·+ M ilG??IS(c− l, l)
 =

Xi1
...
Xic
Xic+1
...
Xil

where the variables marked with underline are the unknowns. By using Gaussian elimination,
we can solve the linear system in O(l3) operations. Hence, the number of operations needed to
obtain X ic given M
i
c and X
i
l−c is O(l3).
In addition to being computationally secure, if Eve is a weak eavesdropper, observing no more
than l − w of the paths, HUNCC is information-theoretically secure.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 is (l, w)-individually secure.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the individual security of the code GIS as given in [36,
Section VI].
We now show the information rate of HUNCC.
Theorem 3. Let 1 ≤ c ≤ l be the number of encrypted paths using the public-key cryptosystem
(Enc,Dec, pi, si, kb, nb). Then, the information rate is:
R =
c · kb
nb
+ (l − c)
l
(2)
In particular, R → 1 with convergence rate O(1
l
).
Proof. The total rate in the multipath network with l paths is obtained directly summing the rate
kb/nb of the c encrypted paths with the rate of 1 in all the remaining l − c paths.
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A few important remarks on HUNCC are in order:
First, it is essential to note that the public-key used in the c encrypted paths of HUNCC is just
the traditional public-key from the underlying cryptosystem. For instance, the one provided in the
McEliece cryptosystem. Hence, this public-key is independent of the ku-messages transmitted
over the multipath network and can be supplied to Alice in advance over a public channel.
Moreover, unlike in information-theoretic security where a unique secret-key is utilized per
message transmitted, as is the case for a one-time pad [1], the public-key in HUNCC can be used
for multiple messages. In the same manner, the generation matrix GIS of the individually secure
code is not confidential. Alice and Bob can agree on it over a public channel, i.e. this matrix
may be revealed to Eve. Also, this matrix may be used indefinitely for any future transmissions.
Another point is related to the security level of HUNCC. As stated in Theorem 1, if the
underlying public-key cryptosystem has security level b, HUNCC is individually computationally
secure with security level at least b− δ
2b
where δ = O(l3). We note that this value is extremely
close to b. Indeed, if b = 128 and we used Gaussian elimination to solve the system pertaining
to Lemma 2, HUNCC would need l > 1038 to reduce the security level by 1.
Finally, although our main focus is on post-quantum cryptosystems, HUNCC can be used
with any public-key cryptosystem, including ones which are combined with a symmetric-key
cryptosystem [38], [50], [51].
In Section VI, we present a more detailed analysis of the performance of HUNCC. And in
Section VII we provide other features and applications of HUNCC.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of HUNCC. We focus on three measures, the
information rate, the individual computational secrecy, and the information-theoretic individual
secrecy. In particular, we compare the trade-off between these quantities as we vary the number
of encrypted links, denoted by c in Algorithm 1.
We start by considering the communication rate, see Theorem 3. We note that the rate increases
as we reduce the number of encrypted links c. On the other hand, the computational security
level remains virtually constant as long as at least one path is encrypted, i.e. c ≥ 1.
Finally, in the case of a weak Eve, the individual security level increases linearly with the
number of links, l − w, from which the weak Eve does not get information. In other words,
while the computational bit-level security remains constant, the uncertainty of an adversary which
observes a subset of the links increases.
Remark 2. In Algorithm 1, we assume that each path utilizes the same public-key cryptosystem,
with identical public and private keys. If we instead opt to use different cryptosystems, each
with independent public and private keys, the total computational security does increase, though
marginally. Using c public-key cryptosystems increases the security level from b to b + log(c).
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Fig. 5: Efficiency and trade-off between security level and communication rate as a function of
the number of encrypted links (using a classical McEliece code of rate ≈ 0.5).
It should be emphasized that this increase on the security level comes at the cost of additional
private-keys needing to be shared prior to the communication phase.
In Figure 5, we illustrate each performance parameter versus the number of encrypted links
c, for HUNCC with the original McEliece cryptosystem using a [1024, 512]-Goppa code. The
information rate over each encrypted path is kb/nb ≈ 0.5. For illustration purposes, we consider
normalized measures of security. Namely: 1) the normalized computational security level is the
security level divided by the maximum computational security that can be obtained by using
the cryptosystem over all links, i.e. f scrypto =
min{c,1}·bcode
bmax
. 2) the normalized individual security
level is the fraction between the number of the links the weak Eve can see divided by the total
links in the network, i.e. f sIS =
l−w
l
.
In the example given in Figure 5, the results are for the case in which the same McEliece
cryptosystem code with the same public-key is used in all the c links. Hence, the normalized
computational security level is zero for c = 0 and one for any c = l. Note that, via Theorem 1,
the computational security level for any 1 ≤ c < l, is bounded by b − δ/2δ, where δ = O(l3).
This difference is negligible and does not appear on the plot, which essentially remains constant
and equal to one for c ≥ 1.
The solution proposed in this paper is not restricted to the original McEliece cryptosystem.
Any cryptosystem can be utilized. To illustrate this, in Figure 6 we present the efficiency of the
proposed solution and the resulting trade-offs for other codes suggested for the McEliece cryp-
tosystem. In particular, the result presented in Figure 6 are for l = 3 and l = 10, and the following
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Fig. 6: Trade-off between security level and communication rate as a function of the number of
encrypted links using different computational security codes.
codes: 1) McEliece cryptosystem with the original parameters, namely [1024, 524]-Goppa code
which achieves b = 58-bit computational security. 2) McEliece cryptosystem with [2960, 2288]-
Goppa code which achieves b = 128-bit computational security, and [6624, 5129]-Goppa code
for b = 256-bit computational security as suggested in [10]. Both have an information rate of
kb/nb ≈ 0.777. Similar parameters for long-term security in post-quantum cryptography are
proposed in [38], namely McEliece with a [6960, 5413]-Goppa code. 3) McEliece cryptosystem
adopting QC-LDPC codes as presented in [52], [53]. For this family of codes, the following
parameters are suggested, kb = 16384 and nb = 24576, i.e. a code with rate kb/nb = 0.6667.
This code achieves b = 75.8-bit computational security. 4) Niederreiter in [39] proposed a
Reed-Solomon code with a rate of 0.57, however the generalized Reed-Solomon codes were
broken [40]. In [54], a Niederreiter-type system, which utilized the same Goppa codes used by
original McEliece construction, and with the same security level, was proposed. That encryption
scheme was also considered in [10] and tested under the state-of-the-art attacks of the McEliece
cryptosystem, and it thus assumed to achieve b = 58-bit computational security.
In this comparison, presented in Figure 6, the maximum computational security level obtained
is of 256-bit using the McEliece cryptosystem with [6624, 5129]-Goppa codes. Hence, the results
presented on the left in Figure 6 for each possible code are normalized with bmax = 256. Recall
that while the computational security level is one of the main parameters considered in choosing
a cryptosystem, another one is the size of the public-key. We note also that the computational
security level of HUNCC remains essentially constant despite increasing the number of links
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Fig. 7: Hybrid post-quantum secure singlepath communication scheme.
that use the cryptosystem or by changing the total number of paths in the network.
VII. OTHER FEATURES AND APPLICATIONS
In this section, we present a few features and applications that exemplify the applicability and
the performance of the proposed HUNCC scheme for extensive essential applications.
A. Single Path Communication
While the main network scheme considered in this work is with multi-paths, the secure
coding scheme we propose in this work is universal in the sense that it can be applied for any
communication network [28]. For instance, it can be used in classical point-to-point single-path
communication, as well as heterogeneous mesh networks. Figure 7 depicts how the proposed
secure scheme can be applied in classical point-to-point single-path communication. In this
setting, similar to the model presented in Section III, there is one source Alice, one legitimate
destination Bob, and an eavesdropper Eve. The main difference is that, in the model presented in
this section, there is only one path to transmit information between Alice and Bob. Alice wants
to transmit securely over the single-path communication a message M of ku symbols over a
finite field Fqu . For this, we propose that Alice and Bob utilize HUNCC as described in Section
V, by essentially simulating parallel virtual links. More precisely, at the first stage Alice will
encode the ku symbols using the linear individual secure code, GIS ∈ Fl×lq . Then, Alice encrypts
c of the symbols before the transmission over the channel using the public-key provided by Bob
over the public directory. The remaining process is as given in Section V. Hence, we obtain the
same communication rate and security level as in the multipath network case.
B. Myopic Adversaries
An additional important scenario considered in the literature is one in which Eve is allowed not
only to eavesdrop the information transmitted over the network, but also to corrupt the encrypted
packets. This scenario is considered in the literature under different models of adversaries, for
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Fig. 8: Myopic adversaries model. The eavesdropper is available not only to eavesdrop the
information transmitted over the network but also to inject errors into 2t packets sent from Alice
to Bob that corrupt those encrypted packets.
instance, with passive attacks [28], [55], [56], myopic adversaries [57]–[60], man in the middle
attack [61], [62], byzantine attacks [63], [64], etc.
In the case of a weak eavesdropper, which can obtain only information from w < l subset of
the paths in the network; we can augment our linear individual security code to perform error
correction, which allows to recover up to t errors which may be injected by Eve. A possible
solution is to generalize the code in the same manner as presented in [28, Sections IV and VII].
Such extension comes at a cost. To correct t injected errors, the rate must be decreased by 2t.
Note that in this setting, the code can support the case in which Eve can corrupt any subset of
messages transmitted over the network, whether they are on the paths which are encrypted, or
not. Indeed, the correction property only relies on the decoding of the linear coding scheme,
and is independent of the deciphering phase.
In the case of a strong eavesdropper, which can obtain the information from all the paths in the
network, we can utilize the same generalized code to correct the t errors that may be injected by
Eve. However, in this case, to ensure security, Alice will need to encrypt at least 2t+1 messages
that are transmitted over the different paths in the network. Hence, we must encrypt the additional
2t messages, transmitted to correct the errors, to prevent Eve from obtaining sufficient encoded
messages by the linear code, which may provide her with the needed rank to decode the total
message.
Future work can consider the case where authentication can be utilized between the encoded
messages to reduce the overhead required to correct the injected errors in the above-proposed
solution. Note that if Bob is able to identify the corrupted messages, Alice needs to include only
one additional symbol per injected error, as opposed to the two messages in the model presented
above. Furthermore, the linear code can be generalized as shown in [28] to support the scenario
where the paths in the network are not error-free [28], [65]. In the case where the cryptosystem
is based on error-correction codes as in the McEliece cryptosystem, instead of adding an error
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Fig. 9: Ultra-reliable low-latency communications for video streaming.
vector at the source, Alice can use the errors of the channel to confuse Eve. The codes in those
cases are designed to be able to decode at the legitimate decoder, given those errors. Hence Bob
will be able to decode the information. All of those extensions allow us to increase the effective
rate of those solutions.
C. Distributed Storage and Cloud Applications
The goal of a distributed storage system is to provide reliable access to data which is spread
over unreliable storage nodes [66]–[68]. Applications involving data centers are ubiquitous
today, Google’s GFS [69], Amazon’s Dynamo [70], Google’s BigTable [71], Facebook’s Apache
Hadoop [72], Microsoft’s WAS [73], LinkedIn’s Voldemort [74] and SkyFlok [75], are just a
few examples.
One of the main drawbacks of distributed storage is that, storing the data at more locations
can potentially increase the risk in the security and privacy of the data [76]–[78]. One way to
address this is by reinterpreting the problem as a multipath network. This is done by considering
Alice and Bob to be the same individual at different times, and the communication links to be
the storage nodes. In this way, the different privacy solutions to the multipath network, including
HUNCC, can be readily applied to secure the data in a distributed storage system. Dealing with
erasures and errors, of both a probabilistic or adversarial nature, can be done analogous to the
way presented in Section VII-B.
D. Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications
Recently the application of network coding in streaming communication which demand low
delays has been considered [79]–[84], with applications in audio/video [85], [86], smart-city
[87], [88], IoT networks and control applications [89], [90], distributed computation [91], etc.
Figure 9 depicts a multi-path low-latency communication for video streaming. Traditional coding
solutions which achieve high throughput are generally not suitable to guarantee low in-order
delivery delay which is a requirement in these applications. This has led to a series of work that
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propose methods to explore the trade-off between high-rate, and low-delay, see e.g. [81]–[84],
[92].
When the communication needs to also be secure, we propose to use HUNCC scheme of
Section V, in conjunction with the coding schemes of say [81]–[84]. While in those works
the number of messages from Alice, that are involved in the linear network encoding process,
depend on the desired rate/delay trade-off, in the security application, this number is further
constrained by the security guarantees that are desired. This might come at the cost of delay, as
more messages may need to be mixed in together to provide secrecy.
Future works of interest include the study of new secure codes for streaming communications
which allow to optimally trade-off delay, security guarantees, and information rate.
E. RSA Cryptosystem
Although in this work, we focus on post-quantum cryptography, and specifically on the
McEliece coding-scheme in the c encrypted paths, any computationally secure cryptosystem
can be used for our solution. Here we briefly discuss an example of how RSA [3] can be
applied in our network-coding solution, in the context of the example given in Figure 2-(e),
i.e. a multipath network with two paths. As a first stage of encoding at Alice, we assume
that the generation matrix, G = ( 1 12 1 ), of the individual security code is used. Such that,
X = MG = [M1+M2,M1+2M2]. Now, say Alice and Bob agree on using an RSA scheme only
over the first path. For 128-bit security, they settle on using a 3072 bit key. Using a 328 bit OAEP
padding, the message size can be at most 2744 bits. Thus, Alice can map X1 into a 2744 bit vector
and encode it using RSA into E(X1, p) ∈ F30722 . Alice will then send log2 |E(X1, p)| = 3072 bits
through channel 1 and log2 |X2| ≤ 2288 bits through channel 2. Thus, the total communication
cost will be around 5360 bits giving a communication rate slightly greater than 0.85.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we suggests a novel secure post-quantum cryptographic scheme that achieves
high communication rates without sacrificing the computational security level. Surprisingly, this
solution based on premixing the information can provide the same security level suggested for
post-quantum security, even if only a single link is encrypted. This is particularly appealing when
a classical public-key cryptosystem (e.g., McEliece coding scheme) can only be used in part of
the data transmitted or stored. In addition to this flexibility, we showed that the information rate
converges to 1 as O(1/l), thus greatly improving upon the current post-quantum cryptosystems.
This scheme demonstrates the potential for hybrid solutions, which combines information-theory
security with public-key cryptography, as a way to improve the performance of the security
schemes in terms of the information rate and security trade-off.
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